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INJUNCTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
WINDFALL TAX
LAwRFwCE BRoH]-KAN*
The recent decision of Judge Baltzell in the first case involv-
ing the tax on unjust enrichment 1 again stimulates speculation
as to the fate of R. S. Section 3224, both in general and with
particular reference to the windfall tax.2 That statute contains
a blanket prohibition against this issuance of injunctions by fed-
eral courts in federal tax cases. At the beginning of the last de-
cade, however, the Supreme Court, while enforcing the prohibi-
tion in the particular cases, began to recognize certain exceptions
to its general language.3 Dicta in these cases indicated that the
statute would be avoided if "some extraordinary and entirely
exceptional circumstances" were presented in addition to the
ordinary grounds of equitable jurisdiction.4
Such hardship or exceptional circumstances were finally pre-
sented in the case of Hill v. Wallace;5 and the court held that the
provisions of the statute were not applicable. Again, in Miller
v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,6 the court held the provision
inapplicable where the tax statute did not cover the complain-
ant's product and the collector had previously informed him it
was not taxable. Still, a different type of exception was recog-
nized in Lipke v Lederer,7 where the court held the statute inap-
* A. B., University of Cincinnati; A. M., University of Cincinnati;
LL. B., Harvard; member of the Ohio Bar.
1KIngan & Co., Inc., v. Smith, S. D. Ind., Sept. 30, 1936. Since the
manuscript was first received this case has reached a more advanced
state than is indicated by the article itself. The government refused
to plead further after its motion to dismiss the complaint was over-
ruled by the court. On October 27 an order of the Court was entered
that the Bill of Complaint, as amended, be taken pro confesso. A final
decree will probably be rendered on or after November 26, and it is
expected that the government will probably appeal at once.
2Rev. Act 1936, Secs. 501-506.
3 Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 122 (1916); Bailey v. George, 259
U. S. 16, 20 (1922).
'For a general discussion of the problems involved, see Notes
(1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1221; (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109.
5259 U. S. 44 (1922).
6284 U. S. 498 (1932).
1259 U. S. 557 (1922).
K. L. J.-2
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plicable to what was in substance a penalty, although denom-
inated a tax by the statute in question.
Until the recent decisions of the Court in the processing tax
case of Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., v. Foutenot s these cases stood
alone and afforded little comfort to the taxpayer who sought a
determination of the validity of the tax before its imposition and
payment. The difficulty which taxpayers had in obtaining equit-
'able relief is shown by the case of Graham v. Du Pont,9 where
truly unusual circumstances were present, and by a large num-
ber of cases involving processing taxes in the lower federal
courts 0 where equitable relief was denied despite the hardship
imposed upon taxpayers in order to obtain a refund in case the
tax, after payment, was held invalid.
The Rickert decisions, therefore, in granting equitable relief
without attempting to bring the results within the recognized
exceptions to IR. S. Section 3224, gave the taxpayer new hope
and, in fact, kindled the feeling that the statute had been laid
to rest. In the first Rickert opinion," an injunction was granted
by a divided court of six to three, without any explanation on the
part of the majority. The cases of Lipce v. Lederer, HiMl v
Wallace, and Miler v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. were not
cited. The court did not find that a penalty was exacted or that
unusual or exceptional circumstances were present. Yet, it
would have been necessary for the court to discuss the particular
nature of the exceptional circumstances if a merely factual situa-
tion were involved so as to bring the case within the rule of the
previous exceptions. Significant, also, is the fact that equitable
relief was denied in both of the lower courts' 2 on the ground that
the case did not fall within the recognized exceptions to the
statute. And the dissent of the three Justices' 3 is inexplicable
without comment from them, unless we assume they were aware
that the majority of the court were disregarding and nullifying
'56 Sup. Ct. 249 (1935); same, 56 Sup. Ct. 374 (1936).
262 U. S. 234 (1923).
"These cases were by no means a majority. In the larger number
of cases under the A. A. A., equitable relief was granted. See 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 109, 114.
n"56 Sup. Ct. 249 (1935).
3(Apparently only the opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals is
reported, 79 Fed. (2d) 700 (1935). The memorandum opinion is even
briefer than that of the Supreme Court.)
1Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, J. J.
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the prohibition contained in the statute. Although it is charac-
teristic of these three Justices to persist in dissent on certain
propositions and holdings of the court, they have always recog-
nized the binding nature of precedent 14 and accompanied their
dissents with observations that the "objectionable" decisions
should be overruled. Absent such observations here, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the Rickert case goes beyond any pre-
vious decisions and, in fact, nullifies R. S. Section 3224.
The significance of Judge Baltzell's decision lies in the fact
that it is the first even to approximate a recognition of this im-
portant development. 15 Judge Baltzell, in effect, says that he
does not understand the first opinion in the Rickert case but that
it must be some new sport in the treatment of R. S. Section 3224.
It would, of course, have been difficult for Judge Baltzell, in the
absence of appropriate explanation in the opinion of the Supreme
Court, to come out as openly as has here been attempted and say
that the Supreme Court actually emasculated Section 3224.
Nevertheless, the important thing is that he was not disturbed
by the decision. He accepted it for what it is. Other judges,
on the other hand, who have dealt with it, have been at an utter
loss to account for it. Thus, Judge Paul, in Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Early,16 was at a loss to account for the issuance of an
injunction in the first Rickert opinion and attempted to explain
it on the ground of exceptional circumstances, despite the fact
that the court itself had not made this the ratia decidendi and
despite the further fact that the two lower courts, aware of this
exception to the statute, had denied the requested relief.
Additional support for the present interpretation of the
Rickert case is furnished by the second opinion of the court in
that case. 17 That case involved the 1935 Amendment to the
"Thus, the second opinion in the Rickert case was unanimous.
The intimations of the opinion are more striking than what is
actually said: "In that case [the second opinion in the Rickert
case], the Supreme Court had previously restrained collection of what
was designated a tax under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, thus
holding that the provisions of Section 3224, supra, did not apply to the
exaction required under the terms of that Act. It is significant that
the injunction was issued in that case [the first opinion in the Rickert
case] by the Supreme Court after it had been denied by both the
District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, but prior to its de-
cision in the case of United States v. Butler, et al., supra."
"13 F. Supp. 610 (W. D. Va., 1936); cf. Mellon v. Mertz, 82 F.
(2d) 872 (App. D. C., 1936).
1,56 Sup. Ct. 374 (1936).
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Agricultural Adjustment Act. The Amendment had not pre-
viously been before the court. Yet, in the same opinion the Act
was held unconstitutional and collection of the impounded tax
funds permanently enjoined. The decision is, of course,
eminently sound in refusing to countenance any attempt to col-
lect a concededly illegal tax. But the decision runs counter to
the earlier case of Bailey v. George,18 in which precisely the
opposite result was reached. Although the Bailey case precedes
the Child Labor Tax Case19 in the reports, it was both argued
and decided on the same days as the latter, and it involved the
same tax or what was there denominated a regulatory measure.
The Supreme Court Journal even indicates that the Child Labor
Tax opinion was handed down before that in the Bailey case, so
that in denying equitable relief, the court held that the mere
unconstitutionality of a tax does not avoid the prohibition of
Section 3224, although there was no room for review of the ques-
tion as to whether the tax was invalid. The Bailey case was not
distinguished or even cited in the Rickert opinion, and it is clear
that it is therein effectively overruled. No legitimate distinction
can be drawn between the decisions on the ground that the
Rickert funds were impounded, whereas, the Bailey funds were
still in the hands of the taxpayer, since the collector was no
more likely to attempt an illegal collection of impounded funds
than a distraint on the property of the taxpayer still in his con-
trol. In fact, if any distinction is to be drawn between the
cases, the Bailey case was more persuasive for the avoidance of
R. S. Section 3224, in that the tax statute was known to be
invalid prior to the denial of equitable relief and in a different
case; whereas, the injunction was issued in the Rickert case at
the same time and in the same opinion as that in which the tax
was held to be illegal.
It does not, of course, follow from the foregoing analysis
that R. S. Section 3224 has been effaced from the statutes as if it
had been declared unconstitutional. In fact, no definite predic-
tion of its fate is warranted. It will undoubtedly still be ap-
plied in ordinary income, estate and similar customary tax cases.
But, it would seem to follow from the Rickert decisions that it
may be ignored in all novel types of taxes which in the least
1a259 U. S. 16 (1922).
2 59 U. S. 20 (1922).
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smack of regulatory measures, penalties, or other illegal exac-
tions. The Standard Nut Margarine Case has been called a
"tribute to the tenacity of the American taxpayer."20 The
Rickert cases may perhaps now be called a tribute to the indigna-
tion of the Supreme Court at Congress's persistent attempts to
exceed its constitutional powers. Taxpayers subject to the wind-
fall tax ought, therefore, to have little difficulty in obtaining a
judicial determination of the validity of the tax by means of in-
junction before collection and payment.
If, however, they should fail to obtain from the Courts the
same response that was accorded by Judge Baltzell, still another
approach is open to them, which differs radically from sugges-
tions which have so far appeared in this connection. 2 1 All Will
agree that equitable relief will be granted, despite the present
status of Section 3224, if an adequate legal remedy does not
exist.22 Thus, if after payment of the tax the taxpayer could
not obtain a refund although the tax had been declared invalid,
he would be entitled to an injunction against its collection.
Now, Title III of the Revenue Act of 1936, which imposes
the Windfall Tax, makes no provision for such refund. A gen-
eral section (See. 503(a)) incorporating "all provisions of law
(including penalties) applicable with respect to taxes imposed
by Title I of this Act" might, indeed, be held to incorporate
Section 322 of Title I providing for overpayments, refunds and
credits, 22a so that no question would arise as to the avoidance
of R. S. Section 3224. This has been the view generally taken of
Title III, Section 503. Such a simple disposition of Section 503,
however, encounters several difficulties.
At the very outset, one is immediately struck by the fact
that despite the general scope of the incorporating provisions,
specific reference is made to the incorporation and inclusion of
the penalty provisions. This at once suggests that the provisions
for refunds have been intentionally omitted.2 3 It is true that
Gorovitz, Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Mar-
garine Cases (1932) 10 Tax Mag. 446.
-"See The Northwestern Miller, Aug. 26, 1936, p. 539; Aug. 5, 1936,
p. 351.
"See 49 Harvard Law Review 109, 113, 114.
2A The same applies to R. S. § 3226, which might thereby be deemed
incorporated into § 503.
-"Nothing to the contrary is contained in Title VIII, Sec. 1001(b).
The latter section merely means, as here applied, that the provisions
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Section 351(c) of Title I-A contains an identical general incor-
porating provision with the exception of certain named sections
which are made specifically inapplicable. But what is said of
Section 503 would perhaps also be true of Section 351(c).
The very nature of the Windfall Tax suggests the possibil-
ity that Congress intended no provision for refunds. The tax
was imposed in order to recapture certain unpaid excises sub-
sequently declared invalid. The tax was thus final in its nature,
an attempt to recoup a loss, to equalize the burden of taxation
between those who had and those who had not paid the invalid
excise. It is not general in its operation. It strikes only a few
who have been guilty of a thereby condemned practice. Even
when applied prospectively to future invalid excises, it is essen-
tially retrospective in effect. Whether valid or not, it applies
only to past acts. It is not imposed in order to acquire new
revenue but to salvage lost revenues. It may, therefore, be said
that Congress did not intend to make room for an evasion or
avoidance of its salvage operations by providing for refunds in
the event the tax was declared invalid. This observation is forti-
fied by Section 501 (1). It is there specifically provided that in
case the Windfall Tax is invalidated, a substitute tax shall be
imposed. The substitute tax is, therefore, intended in lieu of a
refund. Section 501 (1) would have been the proper place for a
refund provision. Its absence gives a striking intimation of the
mental processes of Congress.
Returning now to Section 503 itself, we find that it is identi-
cal to a similar provision in the Guffey Coal Act,24 except that
the latter also incorporated a specific provision for refunds:
"All provisions of law, including penalties and reftnds, * * * )
In denying equitable relief in the Jewell Ridge case, 25 Judge
Paul seems to have had the phrase "and refunds" especially in
mind when he observed that the taxpayer had an adequate
remedy at law for the recovery of an invalid tax.
The Guffey Act thus indicates that the same Congress which
imposed the Windfall Tax was well aware of the method of deal-
for refunds have not been excluded. It does not mean that the use
of "including" precludes the idea that there has been an omission.
Thus, it is not that Congress has thereby excluded the provisions for
refunds but that it has failed properly to include them.
2115 U. S. C. A. Sec. 811.
=Hupra, note 16.
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ing with refunds and incorporating provisions therefor into the
general Administrative Provisions section of the statute. Several
other revenue producing measures enacted by the same congress
lead to a similar conclusion. Thus, in the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act2" there are two specific sections 27 dealing in detail
with the refund of taxes28 imposed by the Act. Yet, Section
619(b) is substantially identical to Section 503 of the Windfall
Tax; and the general incorporating provision29 is contained in a
section headed "Collection of tax; * * *; returns." Two infer-
ences may be drawn from such juxtaposition: (1) The general
incorporating provision is supplemental to and does not cover
the refund sections of the statute; and (2) the general incor-
porating provision relates to administrative matters, procedural
details, concerning the return, payment, collection and penalties
in connection with the tax. Without the specific inclusion of
penalty provisions, the section would deal only with procedural
matters involved in the tax itself, not with what happens to the
tax if not paid, and certainly not with remedies for its recovery
after the tax itself has been disposed of. The inclusion of the
penalty provision, therefore, extends the scope of the section
beyond the mere matter of the tax and covers also what happens
in case the tax has been delayed or not paid. It would take an-
other specific inclusion of a refund provision as in the Guffey
Act 30 to cover the complete scope of tax administration and reach
what becomes important after the tax itself has been disposed of.
Similarly, the Cotton Marketing Act31 contains a section 32
almost identical to Section 503 of the Windfall Tax. But the
general incorporating provision is contained in a section headed
"Offenses and penalties." The heading shows that Section
714(a) does not deal with refunds but solely with procedural
questions relating to violations of the tax statute and what will
happen if the tax is delayed or not paid. The addition of the
phrase "and penalties" in the heading demonstrates the neces-
sity and effectiveness of the phrase "including penalties" in the
procedural provision itself. And that the section in question
"7 U. S. C. A. Sec. 601.
"One in the Amended Act of August, 1935.
Sections 615 and 623 (f).
"Section 619(b).
"15 U. S. C. A. See. 811.
7 U. S. C. A. Sec. 701.
"2 Section 714 (a).
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does not cover refunds is further shown by Section 720 which
makes specific provision for refunds. Again, in the Tobacco
Control Act,33 there is a general incorporating provision3 4 under
the section heading "Collection of Taxes." Again, we must
assume that the provision itself refers only to procedural ques-
tions, such as the return, payment and collection of the tax, and
that the specific mention of penalties extends its scope to what
happens after the tax is due but before it has been paid and
recovery sought. Similarly, Section 761 contains a special re-
fund section as in the other Agricultural Acts; and, although the
Potato Control Act3 5 does not contain a general incorporating
provision, it does provide a method for the recovery of refunds.3 0
To the same effect are Section 143(f) and 58 of the 1936 Reve-
nue Act, Title I, which refer to Section 322 and thus may be
said to make specific provision for refunds.
All of these statutes taken together should prove beyond all
peradventure that Section 503 of Title III makes no provision
for the recovery of the tax if it should later be declared invalid.
The same Congress has demonstrated in numerous instances that
it knows how to deal with and provide for refunds when it deems
it proper or necessary. Failure to so provide in a specific
manner may, therefore, be regarded as evidence of intent to
impose a tax without making provision for its recovery in the
event it is declared illegal, but, on the contrary, disclosing an
intent to substitute a different tax in such event.
The fact that certain sections of the 1936 Act are specifically
excepted by Section 503 from application to the Windfall Tax
in nowise alters the foregoing conclusion. Those sections deal
with substantive matters relating to the tax itself. They have
no bearing upon either penalties or refunds. Hence, as has been
demonstrated above, Section 503 relates only to procedural and
administrative3 7 questions involved in the return, payment and
collection of the tax. The parenthesis, "including penalties,"
enlarges this, but only partially, and not beyond its express
terms.
If the Courts are unwilling categorically to accept the con-
7 U. S. C. A. See. 751.
"Section 756.
7 U. S. C. A. Sec. 801.
Section 815.
"It is denominated "Administrative Provisions" in the heading.
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elusion here drawn, at least it must be admitted sufficient doubt
is presented by Section 503 to warrant injunctive relief on the
ground that the legal remedy for recovery of the tax, if illegal,
is uncertain. The section will not be officially construed until
it reaches the Supreme Court. Although the Court might well
disregard the suggested difficulties inherent in the section, it is
at least possible that they will hold somewhat in the manner of
the present analysis. In the meantime, the taxpayer cannot
know whether he is entitled to a refund or not, in case he pays
an invalid tax. In such situation, the Courts will not close the
portals of equitable jurisdiction to the diligent taxpayer.
